|کد مقاله||کد نشریه||سال انتشار||مقاله انگلیسی||ترجمه فارسی||نسخه تمام متن|
|5036917||1370202||2017||7 صفحه PDF||سفارش دهید||دانلود کنید|
- The impact of different ownership nature to the signal/certification effect is tested.
- Empirical evidence is based on Chinese listed corporations from 2009 to 2013.
- SOEs can receive more subsidies than private enterprises in China.
- The signal effect of R&D grants is stronger in private enterprises than that in SOEs.
- The ownership nature does matter in the R&D subsidies certification effect.
R&D subsidies as a policy instrument are used to reduce market failure, apart from its input and output additionality, the notion of behavioural additionality has caused increasingly interest. We focus on the signal/certification effect of behavioural additionality, which means that government grants may serve as a signal for private investors. The signal effect is a certification enhancing a firm's access to external finance. The objective is to examine the impact of different ownership nature to the signal/certification effect. We use data on Chinese listed corporations from 2009 to 2013. The results show that receiving R&D subsidies increases the likelihood that firms will raise external finance, and the state-owned enterprises can receive more subsidies than private enterprises. However, the signal effect of R&D grants is stronger in private enterprises than that in state-owned enterprises of China, indicating that the ownership nature does matter in the R&D subsidies certification effect. This paper enriches current literature of government R&D subsidies by providing empirical evidences in Chinese mixed market.
Journal: Technological Forecasting and Social Change - Volume 117, April 2017, Pages 339-345