Influence of individual rationality on continuous double auction markets with networked traders

This paper investigates the influence of individual rationality of buyers and sellers on continuous double auction market outcomes in terms of the proportion of boundedly-rational buyers and sellers. The individual rationality is discussed in a social network artificial stock market model by embedding network formation and information set. Traders automatically select the most profitable trading strategy based on individual and social learning of the profits and trading strategies of themselves and their neighbors, and submit orders to markets. The results show that (i) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a higher market price, higher sellers' profits and a higher market efficiency; (ii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a lower number of trades and lower buyers' profits; (iii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces a lower market price, a lower number of trades, and lower sellers' profits; (iv) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces higher buyers' profits and a higher market efficiency.