Performing and mitigating force and terrorist fraud attacks against two RFID distance-bounding protocols

Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems have been used in widespread applications to identify any object. The growth of wireless systems has caused security and privacy vulnerabilities in RFID systems with limited resources and low cost provers. Authentication allows that the information is transfered between only authorized people; thus, we allow different levels of access to information for different people. Distance-bounding authentication protocols are one of the most efficient methods for authentication in RFID systems. Distance-bounding protocols have been proposed to address attacks related to location such as distance fraud attack, Mafia fraud attack, and terrorist fraud attack. In this paper, we examine the two new proposed distance-bounding protocols MP, and KA and prove that these protocols are vulnerable against terrorist fraud attack and force attack. Finally, we improve these two schemes. Then we show that our two improved protocols are resistant against the attacks.