

Accepted Manuscript

Implicit communication in the ultimatum game

Markus Brunner, Andreas Ostermaier

PII: S2214-8043(18)30385-9
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.08.003>
Reference: JBEE 1348



To appear in: *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*

Received date: 4 September 2017
Revised date: 16 August 2018
Accepted date: 16 August 2018

Please cite this article as: Markus Brunner, Andreas Ostermaier, Implicit communication in the ultimatum game, *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics* (2018), doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.08.003>

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Highlights

- Modified ultimatum games highlight the role of implicit communication in bargaining.
- Responders' decisions are partly driven by the intent to communicate to proposers.
- Responders reject low offers to show disapproval and accept low offers to hide envy.
- To manipulate implicit communication, we reveal or conceal responders' decisions.
- We complement literature on explicit communication (e.g., text chat) in bargaining.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/10226660>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/10226660>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)