Accepted Manuscript

Cooperation risk and Nash equilibrium: Quantitative description for realistic players

G.M. Nakamura, G.S. Contesini, Alexandre S. Martinez

PII: \$0378-4371(18)31326-8

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2018.09.194

Reference: PHYSA 20255

To appear in: Physica A

Received date: 25 July 2018 Revised date: 17 September 2018

Please cite this article as: G.M. Nakamura, et al., Cooperation risk and Nash equilibrium: Quantitative description for realistic players, *Physica A* (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2018.09.194

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

*Highlights (for review)

- A formal mathematical description of cooperation risk, restoring the individual requirements of Nash equilibrium in potential games.
- Discovery of first- and second-order phase transitions between non- oo erative and cooperative behavior.
- Description of public goods games with punishments and cooperation risk using algebraic operators.

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/11001589

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/11001589

<u>Daneshyari.com</u>