

Accepted Manuscript

Multi-dimensional Procurement Auction under Uncertain and Asymmetric Information

Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Peter Bogetoft

PII: S0377-2217(16)30812-8
DOI: [10.1016/j.ejor.2016.09.060](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.09.060)
Reference: EOR 14021



To appear in: *European Journal of Operational Research*

Received date: 26 November 2015
Revised date: 4 August 2016
Accepted date: 30 September 2016

Please cite this article as: Athanasios Papakonstantinou, Peter Bogetoft, Multi-dimensional Procurement Auction under Uncertain and Asymmetric Information, *European Journal of Operational Research* (2016), doi: [10.1016/j.ejor.2016.09.060](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.09.060)

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Highlights

- We propose a multi-dimensional auction for estimating uncertain qualities and costs.
- A two-step strictly proper scoring rule payment ensures relevant economic properties.
- Agents generate and truthfully offer estimates at the principal's required precision.
- A consistent set of Bayesian estimators achieves the second score auction outcome.
- Simulations show low sensitivity to the selected agent's estimate's precision.

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/4959798>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/4959798>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)