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

Implementation in Undominated Strategies with Partially Honest Agents

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Highlights

- The agents are assumed to have strict preferences for being sincere.
- We provide a necessary and sufficient condition of implementability.
- Examples of social choice correspondences explain the usefulness of the condition.
- The Pareto correspondence is implemented by a finite mechanism.

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