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Accounting for Context: Separating Monetary and (Uncertain) Social Incentives

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Highlights

- We propose a simple framework to model social preferences
- The framework separates economic incentives and social norms
- Paying to avoid certain contexts can be rational
- The effect of a weak norm is tested using a randomized controlled class room experiment (Prisoners' dilemma).
- Women cooperate more, but are also more sensitive to a social norm suggesting defection

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