

## Accepted Manuscript


Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games

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PII: S0167-4870(16)30288-4  
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.005>  
Reference: JOEP 1920

To appear in: *Journal of Economic Psychology*

Received Date: 23 July 2014  
Revised Date: 19 April 2016  
Accepted Date: 21 May 2016



Please cite this article as: Bayer, R.C., Renou, L., Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games, *Journal of Economic Psychology* (2016), doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.05.005>

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## Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games\*

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May 23, 2016

**Abstract**

This paper investigates the impact of cognitive abilities and preferences on behavior in games. We first measure subjects' logical abilities and social preferences and then evaluate their influence on behavior in strategic-form games. For this purpose, we estimate how logical abilities and preferences relate to the probability of a subject being of a specific behavioral type. We find that better logical abilities increase the likelihood of sophisticated behavior. This shift is stronger for subjects who are classified as "selfish". However, not even the most logically able, selfish subjects are identified as Nash types.

**Keywords:** logical ability, behaviors, strategic-form games, experiments, preferences, sophistication.

**JEL Classification Numbers:** C70, C91.

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\*We thank the Economic Design Network Australia and the University of Adelaide for funding and are grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments.

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