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Quality screening and information disclosure in two-sided markets

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### Highlights (for review)

- We compare two types of quality screening through which a monopoly platform can disclosure quality information: minimum threshold and multiple thresholds
- The optimal screening format depends on the cross-group externalities and the operation cost of the platform.
- The equilibrium value of threshold (s) changes with the cross-group externality, but their comparative statics can be different under the two screening formats.

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