Accepted Manuscript

Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts

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
PII: S0165-1765(18)30140-X

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.011

Reference: ECOLET 8010

To appear in: Economics Letters

Received date: 8 December 2017 Revised date: 12 April 2018 Accepted date: 12 April 2018



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Highlights : Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts

We consider a contest game between two groups of different sizes.

The prize is an impure public good with a varying degree of rivalry.

Group members' contributions exhibit a varying degree of complementarity.

Higher degrees of complementarity work to the advantage of the larger group.

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