Accepted Manuscript



On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness

Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill

PII: S0899-8256(18)30036-8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.005
Reference: YGAME 2843

To appear in: *Games and Economic Behavior*

Received date: 12 May 2017

Please cite this article in press as: Aziz, H., et al. On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. *Games Econ. Behav.* (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.005

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Highlights

- Random serial dictatorships are PC-strategyproof, but only ex post efficient.
- Strict maximal lotteries are PC-efficient, but only ST-strategyproof.
- PC-efficiency, PC-strategyproofness, and neutrality are incompatible.
- Ex post efficiency, BD-strategyproofness, and pairwiseness are incompatible.
- Ex post efficiency, BD-group-strategyproofness, and neutrality are incompatible.

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7352747

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/7352747

Daneshyari.com