Accepted Manuscript

Punching out of one's weight class? Cross agreement retaliation in the WTO

James C. Hartigan

PII: S1059-0560(17)30680-9

DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.09.002

Reference: REVECO 1492

To appear in: International Review of Economics and Finance

Received Date: 2 March 2016

Revised Date: 16 September 2017

Accepted Date: 17 September 2017

Please cite this article as: Hartigan J.C., Punching out of one's weight class? Cross agreement retaliation in the WTO, *International Review of Economics and Finance* (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.09.002.

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



Punching out of One's Weight Class? Cross Agreement retaliation in the WTO^{\Leftrightarrow}

James C. Hartigan^a

^aDepartment of Economics, University of Oklahoma, Cate Center I, Norman, Oklahoma 73072 USA

Abstract

Agreements are expressed in terms of the level of standards, which serves as a proxy for the degree of permitted discretion. A pair of sub-agreements constitutes the treaty. The extent to which preferences of governments entail cross agreement linkages in negotiation are presented. The model is applied to the WTO's DSU, revealing that it contributes to performance of the agreement when a regime is elected desiring weaker commitments. When cross agreement retaliation is more effective than within agreement retaliation is disclosed. This does not depend upon power disparities of the signatories, although implications for the achievement of negotiations may exist. This template helps you to create a properly formatted IATEX manuscript.

Keywords: WTO Trade Agreements; Cross Agreement Retaliation; Standards; Power Disparities; Dispute Settlement Understanding elsarticle.cls, LATEX, Elsevier, template 2010 MSC: 00-01, 99-00

Preprint submitted to Journal of LATEX Templates

September 28, 2017

^{*}Thanks without implication are given to Ron Davies, James Lake, Qihong Liu, Tyler Ransom, Greg Wright, participants at the Society for International Trade Theory Meetings, and the anonymous referees. Gratitude is extended to the Sutherland School of Law at University College- Dublin, where parts of this paper were written, for its hospitality.

^{*}Corresponding author

Email address: hartiganCou.edu (James C. Hartigan)

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/7355487

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/7355487

Daneshyari.com