Keywords: G14; Z1; D44; Art market; Market efficiency; Auction; Silver;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: C70; D82; D44; Multi-stage contests; Multi-prize contests; Variable costs;
Keywords: D44; D61; D73; H11; H41; H54; H57; Auction; Bundling; Reserve prices; Multiobjects;
Keywords: D43; D44; D47; D82; Auctions; Externalities; Downstream competition; Multi-unit;
Keywords: Competing auctions; Directed search; Team production; D44; D83; E24; J31;
Keywords: D44; Second-price sealed-bid auction;
Keywords: D01; D02; D04; D44; Q21; Renewable energy support; Auction;
Keywords: C72; D44; All-pay auctions; Reimbursement;
Keywords: D44; D47; Auctions; Fishing quota; Fisheries management; Grandfathering;
Keywords: D44; Q52; Pollution permit auction; Consignment;
Keywords: C72; D44; Procurement; Auctions; Mechanism design;
Keywords: C70; C72; C79; D44; D63; D82; Exchange mechanism; Minimal complexity; Prices; Markets; Money;
Keywords: C78; D44; D47; D82; Matching; Strategy-proofness; Lone Wolf Theorem; Rural Hospitals Theorem;
Keywords: C72; D44; D47; D61; D82; Auctions; Multi-unit auctions; Market power; Large auctions; Asymmetric first price auctions;
Keywords: All-pay auction; Lottery contest; Favoritism; Head start; Revenue dominance; C72; D44; D72;
Keywords: Auctions; Experimental economics; Core-selecting auctions; Collusion; D44; C90;
Keywords: L14; C91; D85; D44; G10; Experiment; Economic networks; Intermediation; Liquidity; Auctions; Budget constraints;
Keywords: C11; C44; D44; First-price auction; Identification; Ambiguity aversion; Bayesian estimation;
Keywords: C78; D44; D47; D82; Matching; Large markets; Lone wolf theorem; Strategy-proofness;
Keywords: Patent licensing; Dynamic mechanisms; Menu auctions; D21; D43; D44; D45;
Keywords: Multi-unit auction; Pollution permit; Allowance reserve; D44; L50; Q52;
Keywords: C62; C72; D43; D44; L94; Multi-unit auctions; Indivisible unit; Price instability; Supply function equilibria; Convergence of Nash equilibria; Wholesale electricity markets;
Keywords: D44; D82; D72; Auctions; Asymmetric information structures; Underbidding; Public information;
Keywords: Double auction; Market power; Institutions; Information; Experimental economics; C92; D02; D43; D44; L13;
Keywords: C72; D44; D47; D61; D63; D82; Ex post incentive compatibility; Random allocation; Random priority; Large market; Rational expectations equilibrium; Information aggregation;
Keywords: Spectrum sharing; Spectrum sharing mechanisms; Efficiency; Optimality; D44; D82; L52;
Keywords: Electricity; Capacity markets; Reliability; Market power; Regulation; Renewables; D44; L13; L50; L94; Q40;
Keywords: C72; D44; D47; Combinatorial auctions; Iterative auctions; Vickrey auction; Dynamic auctions; Ascending auctions;
Keywords: Adjusted bids; Overbidding; Secondary market; Willingness-to-pay; D44; C91,;
Keywords: C14; D44; First-price auction; Risk aversion; Independent private values; Nonparametric estimation; Sieve spaces;
Keywords: C72; D44; D82; Optimal mechanism design; Robustness; Incentive compatibility; Individual rationality; Ambiguity aversion; Moment conditions;
Keywords: C78; D44; D45; Rationing price equilibrium; (Extended) English Price Sequences; Iterative English Auction Rule;
Keywords: D44; D61; D71; D82; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Non-quasi-linearity; Minimum price rule; Equilibrium structure; Normal-richness; Common-object-ranking domain; Common-tiered-object domain;
Keywords: D44; C72; I20; I28; L53; Affirmative action; Contests; Approximate equilibrium;
Keywords: D82; D44; D47; Separable types; Affine maximizer; Roberts' theorem;
Keywords: C70; C72; C79; D44; D63; D82; Exchange mechanism; Minimal complexity; Money;
Keywords: D44; D83; L14; Procurement auctions; Communication; Promises; Social distance; Reputation; Moral hazard;
Keywords: C78; D44; D82; Bargaining; Auction; Procurement; Merger; Hiring; Investment;
Keywords: Hidden order; Order execution; Limit order market; Dynamic programming; C61; D44; G11; G18;
Keywords: D44; D82; C91; Auctions; Winner's curse; Conditional reasoning; Beliefs;
Keywords: Electricity auctions; Wholesale electricity markets; Transmission capacity constraints; Network tariffs; Energy economics; D43; D44; L13; L94;
Keywords: C72; D44; D71; D82; Sequential values; Sharing; Network; Redistribution;
Keywords: C73; D44; D47; Double auctions; Individual rationality; Social networks; Algorithmic trading; Agent-based modeling;
Keywords: Electricity market design; Subsidized entry; Resource adequacy; Regulatory policy; Multi-unit auctions; D44; L13; L50; L94;
Keywords: D44; D47; D82; D86; Package auction; Equilibrium strategies; Spectrum auction; Market design;
Keywords: D44; D82; C72; Tullock contests; Private values; Information sharing;
Keywords: C5; C14; D44; First-price auctions; Bidding functions; Risk aversion; Shaped constrained estimator;
Keywords: C73; C92; D44; D72; D74; Dynamic contest; Multi-battle contest; Player type; Experiment; All-pay auction; Escalation; Last stand; Maximin;
Keywords: Laboratory experiments; Second-price common value auctions; Winner's curse; Level-k; Cursed equilibrium; C92; D44; D82;
Keywords: L10; L50; L96; D44; 3G mobile diffusion; Beauty contests; Spectrum auctions; Treatment effects;