



Affine-evasive sets modulo a prime

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ABSTRACT

In this work, we describe a simple and efficient construction of a large subset S of \mathbb{F}_p , where p is a prime, such that the set $A(S)$ for any non-identity affine map A over \mathbb{F}_p has small intersection with S .

Such sets, called affine-evasive sets, were defined and constructed in [1] as the central step in the construction of non-malleable codes against affine tampering over \mathbb{F}_p , for a prime p . This was then used to obtain efficient non-malleable codes against split-state tampering.

Our result resolves one of the two main open questions in [1]. It improves the rate of non-malleable codes against affine tampering over \mathbb{F}_p from $\log \log p$ to a constant, and consequently the rate for non-malleable codes against split-state tampering for n -bit messages is improved from $n^6 \log^7 n$ to n^6 .

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1. Introduction

Non-malleable codes (NMCs) NMCs were introduced in [5] as a beautiful relaxation of error-correction and error-detection codes. Informally, given a tampering family \mathcal{F} , an NMC (Enc, Dec) against \mathcal{F} encodes a given message m into a codeword $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(m)$ in a way that, if the adversary modifies m to $c' = f(c)$ for some $f \in \mathcal{F}$, then the message $m' = \text{Dec}(c')$ is either the original message m , or a completely “unrelated value”. As has been shown by the recent progress [5,9,4,1,7,6,2,3] NMCs aim to handle a much larger class of tampering functions \mathcal{F} than traditional error-correcting or error-detecting codes, at the expense of potentially allowing the attacker to replace a given message x by an unrelated message x' . NMCs are useful in situations where changing x to an unrelated x' is not useful for the attacker (for example, when x is the secret key for a signature scheme.)

Split-state model NMCs do not exist for the class of all functions \mathcal{F}_{all} . In particular, it does not include functions of

the form $f(c) := \text{Enc}(h(\text{Dec}(c)))$, since $\text{Dec}(f(\text{Enc}(m))) = h(m)$ is clearly related to m . One of the largest and practically relevant tampering families for which we can construct NMCs is the so-called split-state tampering family where the codeword is split into two parts $c_1 \| c_2$, and the adversary is only allowed to tamper with c_1 , c_2 independently to get $f_1(c_1) \| f_2(c_2)$. A lot of the aforementioned results [9,4,1,3,6] have studied NMCs against split-state tampering. Aggarwal et al. [1] gave the first (and the only one so far) information-theoretically secure construction in the split-state model from n -bit messages to $n^7 \log^7 n$ -bit codewords (i.e., code rate $n^6 \log^7 n$). The security proof of this scheme relied on an amazing property of the inner-product function modulo a prime, that was proved using results from additive combinatorics.

Affine-evasive sets and our result One of the crucial steps in the construction of [1] was the construction of NMC against affine tampering modulo p . This was achieved by constructing an affine-evasive set of size $p^{1/\log \log p}$ modulo a prime p . It was asked as an open question whether there exists an affine-evasive set of size $p^{\epsilon(1)}$, which will imply constant rate NMC against affine-tampering and rate n^6

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NMC against split-state tampering.¹ We resolve this question in the affirmative by giving an affine-evasive set of size $\Theta(\frac{p^{1/4}}{\log p})$.

2. Explicit construction

For any set $S \subset \mathbb{Z}$, let $aS + b = \{as + b \mid s \in S\}$. By $S \bmod p \subseteq \mathbb{F}_p$, we denote the set of values of S modulo p . We first define an affine-evasive set $S \subseteq \mathbb{F}_p$.

Definition 1. A non-empty set $S \subseteq \mathbb{F}_p$ is said to be (γ, ν) -affine-evasive if $|S| \leq \gamma p$, and for any $(a, b) \in \mathbb{F}_p^2 \setminus \{(1, 0)\}$, we have

$$|S \cap (aS + b \pmod{p})| \leq \nu |S|.$$

Now we give a construction of an affine-evasive set.

Let $Q := \{q_1, \dots, q_t\}$ be the set of all primes less than $\frac{1}{2}p^{1/4}$. Define $S \subset \mathbb{F}_p$ as follows:

$$S := \left\{ \frac{1}{q_i} \pmod{p} \mid i \in [t] \right\}. \quad (1)$$

Thus, S has size $\Theta(\frac{p^{1/4}}{\log p})$ by the prime number theorem.

Theorem 1. For any prime p , the set S defined in Eq. (1) is $(\frac{1}{2}p^{-3/4}, O(p^{-1/4} \cdot \log p))$ -affine-evasive.

Proof. Clearly,

$$|S| = t \leq \frac{1}{2}p^{1/4} = \frac{1}{2}p^{-3/4} \cdot p.$$

Fix $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p$, such that $(a, b) \neq (1, 0)$. Now, we show that $|S \cap (aS + b \pmod{p})| \leq 3$. Assume, on the contrary, that there exist distinct $\alpha_i \in Q$ for $i \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ such that $1/\alpha_i \pmod{p} \in S \cap (aS + b \pmod{p})$. We have

$$\frac{a}{\beta_i} + b = \frac{1}{\alpha_i} \pmod{p} \quad \text{for } i = 0, 1, 2, 3, \quad (2)$$

where $\beta_i, \alpha_i \in Q$ for $i \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$, and $\alpha_i \neq \alpha_j$ for any $i \neq j$.

For any i , if $\beta_i = \alpha_i$, then $b \cdot \beta_i = 1 - a \pmod{p}$, which has at most one solution (since we assume $(a, b) \neq (1, 0)$). Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that $\beta_i \neq \alpha_i$, for $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, and $\beta_1 < \beta_2 < \beta_3$.

From Eq. (2), we have that

$$\frac{\frac{a}{\beta_1} + b - \frac{a}{\beta_2} - b}{\frac{a}{\beta_1} + b - \frac{a}{\beta_3} - b} = \frac{\frac{1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{1}{\alpha_2}}{\frac{1}{\alpha_1} - \frac{1}{\alpha_3}} \pmod{p},$$

which on simplification implies

$$\begin{aligned} & (\alpha_3 - \alpha_1)(\beta_2 - \beta_1)\beta_3\alpha_2 \\ &= (\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)(\beta_3 - \beta_1)\beta_2\alpha_3 \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that both the left-hand and right-hand side of the above equation takes values between $\frac{p}{16}$ and $\frac{p}{16}$, and hence the equality holds in \mathbb{Z} (and not just in \mathbb{Z}_p).

$$(\alpha_3 - \alpha_1)(\beta_2 - \beta_1)\beta_3\alpha_2 = (\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)(\beta_3 - \beta_1)\beta_2\alpha_3. \quad (3)$$

By Eq. (3), we have that β_3 divides $(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)(\beta_3 - \beta_1)\beta_2\alpha_3$. Clearly, β_3 is relatively prime to α_3 , β_2 , and $\beta_3 - \beta_1$. Therefore, β_3 divides $(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)$. This implies

$$\beta_3 \leq |\alpha_2 - \alpha_1|. \quad (4)$$

Also, from Eq. (3), we have that α_2 divides $(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)(\beta_3 - \beta_1)\beta_2\alpha_3$, which by similar reasoning implies α_2 divides $\beta_3 - \beta_1$. Thus, using that $\beta_3 > \beta_1$,

$$0 < \alpha_2 \leq \beta_3 - \beta_1 < \beta_3. \quad (5)$$

Similarly, we can obtain α_1 divides $\beta_3 - \beta_2$, which implies

$$0 < \alpha_1 \leq \beta_3 - \beta_2 < \beta_3. \quad (6)$$

Eqs. (5) and (6) together imply that $|\alpha_2 - \alpha_1| < \beta_3$, which contradicts Eq. (4). \square

3. Affine-evasive function and efficient NMCs

Affine-evasive function We recall here the definition of affine-evasive functions from [1]. Affine-evasive functions immediately give efficient construction of NMCs against affine-tampering.

Definition 2. A surjective function $h : \mathbb{F}_p \mapsto \mathcal{M} \cup \{\perp\}$ is called (γ, δ) -affine-evasive if for any $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p$ such that $a \neq 0$, and $(a, b) \neq (1, 0)$, and for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$,

1. $\Pr_{U \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p} (h(aU + b) \neq \perp) \leq \gamma$.
2. $\Pr_{U \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p} (h(aU + b) \neq \perp \mid h(U) = m) \leq \delta$.
3. A uniformly random X such that $h(X) = m$ is efficiently samplable.

We now mention a result that shows that we can construct an affine-evasive function from an affine-evasive set S .

Lemma 1. (See [1, Claim 5].) Let $S \subseteq \mathbb{F}_p$ be a (γ, ν) -affine-evasive set with $\nu \cdot K \leq 1$, and K divides $|S|$.² Furthermore, let S be ordered such that for any i , the i -th element is efficiently computable in $O(\log p)$. Then there exists a $(\gamma, \nu \cdot K)$ -affine-evasive function $h : \mathbb{F}_p \mapsto \mathcal{M} \cup \{\perp\}$.

Note that the above result requires that for any i , the i -th element of S is efficiently computable for some ordering of the set S . This is not possible for our construction since for our construction this would mean efficiently sampling the i -th largest prime. However, this requirement was made just to make sure that h^{-1} is efficiently samplable. We circumvent this problem by giving a slightly modified definition of the affine-evasive function h in the proof of Lemma 2. Before proving this, we state the following result that we will need.

¹ Under a plausible conjecture, this will imply constant rate NMC against split-state tampering. See Theorem 5 for more details.

² The assumption K divides $|S|$ is just for simplicity.

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