



Discussion

Taking ‘know’ for an answer: A reply to Nagel, San Juan, and Mar

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ABSTRACT

Nagel, San Juan, and Mar report an experiment investigating lay attributions of knowledge, belief, and justification. They suggest that, in keeping with the expectations of philosophers, but contra recent empirical findings [Starmans, C. & Friedman, O. (2012). The folk conception of knowledge. *Cognition*, 124, 272–283], laypeople consistently deny knowledge in Gettier cases, regardless of whether the beliefs are based on ‘apparent’ or ‘authentic’ evidence. In this reply, we point out that Nagel et al. employed a questioning method that biased participants to deny knowledge. Moreover, careful examination of participants’ responses reveals that they attributed knowledge in Gettier cases. We also note that Nagel et al. misconstrue the distinction between ‘apparent’ and ‘authentic’ evidence, and use scenarios that do not feature the structure that characterizes most Gettier cases. We conclude that NS&M’s findings are fully compatible with the claim that laypeople attribute knowledge in Gettier cases in general, but are significantly less likely to attribute knowledge when a belief is generated based on apparent evidence.

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1. Introduction

Which claims should be considered mere beliefs and which count as knowledge? For thousands of years, philosophers have sought to answer this question through debate. Although this debate continues, a general consensus has emerged among philosophers: Beliefs typically count as knowledge when they are justified and true, but justified true beliefs can fall short of knowledge in scenarios termed ‘Gettier’ cases. Recently, psychologists and experimental philosophers have begun running experiments to discover the conditions under which people attribute knowledge. In a recent paper taking this approach, Starmans and Friedman (2012; henceforth S&F) found a conflict between laypeople’s intuitions about knowledge

and the views espoused by philosophers. Although laypeople share the intuition that justified true beliefs typically count as knowledge, they do not deny knowledge in Gettier cases. People do deny knowledge in a subset of Gettier cases, where the agent’s belief is based on ‘apparent’ evidence rather than ‘authentic’ evidence. But this suggests that they are sensitive to the nature of evidence justifying beliefs, rather than ‘Gettiering’ more generally.

Nagel, San Juan, and Mar (this issue; henceforth NS&M) report an experiment investigating lay attributions of knowledge, belief, and justification. Their findings provide support for previous findings that laypeople recognize a difference between knowledge and justified true belief (see also Buckwalter & Stich, 2010; Starmans & Friedman, 2012; Turri, forthcoming; Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001). They also provide the first confirmation that, as has been only assumed in previous work, laypeople do in fact consider the beliefs described in these scenarios to be justified. Furthermore, they replicate recent findings that knowledge attributions are not generally affected by demographic variables (Starmans & Friedman, 2012; Turri, forthcoming; Wright, 2010; but see Buckwalter, 2010;

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Weinberg et al., 2001), though they find evidence for the interesting suggestion that more empathetic individuals are more likely to attribute knowledge to others. Finally, contrary to S&F, but in keeping with the expectations of philosophers, they claim that laypeople consistently deny knowledge in Gettier cases, including both cases where belief are based on 'apparent' or 'authentic' evidence.

In this reply we make three points relevant to understanding this last, most striking, finding. First, although NS&M suggest that laypeople deny knowledge in authentic evidence Gettier cases, the authentic evidence cases they tested feature a different structure than most Gettier cases, including the cases used by S&F. As a result, although these cases may be interesting to examine, knowledge attribution in these cases is not informative about how laypeople reason about most Gettier cases. Second, NS&M inaccurately equate the distinction between 'apparent' and 'authentic' evidence raised by S&F with the distinction between 'false lemmas' and 'no false lemmas', raised by Clark (1963; see also Harman, 1973). Finally, NS&M employed a questioning method that biased participants to deny knowledge. However, careful examination of their responses reveals that participants attributed knowledge at high rates in Gettier cases, and perhaps at higher rates than in S&F. We conclude that NS&M's findings are fully compatible with the claim that laypeople attribute knowledge in Gettier cases in general, but are significantly less likely to attribute knowledge when a belief is generated based on apparent evidence.

2. The structure of Gettier cases

Why care about whether laypeople attribute knowledge in Gettier cases? Gettier's initial goal in raising this type of case was as an existence proof against the classical view that any justified true belief (JTB) counts as knowledge. The vast majority of philosophers now accept this, and that laypeople also sometimes deny knowledge in cases of JTB is by now well established. In fact, a variety of factors beyond truth and justification have been shown to affect knowledge attributions, including stakes, pragmatic load, morality, performance errors, and demographic variation (e.g., Buckwalter, 2012 for review). And in their current paper, NS&M find that laypeople fail to attribute knowledge in a distinct set of cases in which there is no 'Gettiering', but merely a reminder that it might be prudent to be skeptical about knowledge.

What continues to be interesting about Gettier cases, then, is that they provide the opportunity to test which factors affect knowledge attributions. Gettier's original two cases, and most all cases to follow, share a common structure. They describe a situation in which a person has a belief that is both justified and true, but the fact that justifies the belief is not the same fact that makes the belief true. For instance, S&F provide an example case in which Peter places his watch on his coffee table. While Peter is out of the room briefly, a burglar steals his watch and replaces it with another watch. Peter formed the belief that there was a watch on his table because he put *his* watch on the table, but at the end of the scenario, Peter's belief is true

for a completely different reason—it is true because the burglar left a different watch on the table. So examining intuitions about Gettier cases allows us to test whether people's knowledge attributions are sensitive to this disconnect between the fact that justifies the belief and the fact that makes it true.

However, NS&M base their authentic evidence cases on a class of cases that do not feature the disconnect structure that characterizes most Gettier cases. Their cases are modeled on Ginet's "Fake Barn" cases (Goldman, 1976). The original case describes a rural landscape which appears to be populated with many barns. Looking at one of these objects, Henry believes he's looking at a barn. And, in fact, Henry is looking at a barn. However the barn he is looking at is the only genuine barn in the whole area—the rest are very convincing facades, made to look like barns. In this case, the evidence for the agent's belief (i.e., seeing a particular barn in the field) is the *same* fact that makes the agent's belief true. So although such 'fake barn' cases are often referred to as Gettier cases, they do not feature the disconnect characteristic of most other Gettier cases. And in fact, philosophers themselves are quite divided on whether to attribute knowledge in these cases (e.g., Lycan, 2006; Sosa, 2007; Turri, 2012).

As a result, examining knowledge attribution in these cases does not shed light on whether people are sensitive to the factor common to most other Gettier cases—the disconnect between the fact that justifies the belief and the fact that makes the belief true. In contrast, S&F provide evidence that laypeople are not sensitive to this factor; in 3 studies participants attributed knowledge in scenarios featuring this disconnect. A fourth study confirmed that while people sometimes do deny knowledge in Gettier scenarios, it is not because of the disconnect described above, but because of the nature of the evidence justifying the original belief.

3. Evidence and lemmas

NS&M report that laypeople deny knowledge in two types of Gettier cases, which they refer to as 'authentic evidence' and 'apparent evidence' (adopted from S&F). They suggest that this distinction between apparent and authentic evidence is identical to the distinction between false lemmas and no false lemmas (Clark, 1963). More specifically, they suggest that apparent evidence cases are equivalent to false lemma cases, where an agent arrives at a true belief by reasoning on the basis of false steps, and that authentic evidence cases are equivalent to no false lemma cases, where no false steps occur in the agent's reasoning. However, these two distinctions are not equivalent.

S&F introduce the terms authentic and apparent evidence to capture a distinction between two sorts of evidence an agent can have when initially *forming* a belief. Authentic evidence is informative about how the world actually is when the belief is formed, and basing a belief on authentic evidence necessarily makes the belief true when it is formed. Apparent evidence only appears to be informative about how the world actually is, and basing a belief on apparent evidence does not guarantee that the belief is true when it is formed.

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