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ELECTION RULES, LEGISLATORS' INCENTIVES,
AND POLICY OUTCOMES:
EVIDENCE FROM THE MIXED MEMBER SYSTEM IN GERMANY

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ABSTRACT

Committee membership in mixed-member systems presents an informative setting for studying legislators' behavior under majoritarian vs. proportional electoral incentives. Committee membership allows for a determination as to whether legislators sort themselves into committees that are more consistent with an objective to win the next election in their electoral district, or more consistent with gaining a more prestigious position in their party. Using data from three large German states, we find that legislators elected in the electoral system's majoritarian tier more often become members of "district committees," i.e., committees that might give politicians greater opportunity than others to obtain government funds for the benefit of their home districts. This effect is strongest for legislators who won district elections by narrow margins. Moreover, we find that districts that are better represented on "district committees" receive more government funds.

Keywords: transfers, committees, electoral rules, mixed-member system, comparative political economy

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