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Information Asymmetry and Exposure Effects in Dictator Games

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
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## Highlights

- A model describes interaction of information asymmetries and inequality aversion.
- Even a very small exposure significantly increases transfers to recipients.
- Beliefs about concealment of one's own actions are crucial for dictator's decisions.

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