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Cooperation in a sequential dilemma game: How much transparency is good for cooperation?

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Highlights

- Nishihara (1997) shows that not knowing the order of move may allow for rational cooperation
- We test this theory in an economic experiment
- The experimental treatments vary transparency regarding subjects' order of move
- Knowing the order of move does not result in less cooperation, and may even increase cooperation

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