Accepted Manuscript

Limited attention, competition and welfare

Andreas Hefti

Received date:

Revised date:

Accepted date:

PII:S0022-0531(18)30627-6DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.012Reference:YJETH 4829To appear in:Journal of Economic Theory

7 March 2016

24 September 2018

29 September 2018



Please cite this article in press as: Hefti, A. Limited attention, competition and welfare. J. Econ. Theory (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.012

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

LIMITED ATTENTION, COMPETITION AND WELFARE*

By Andreas Hefti[†]

Abstract

This article presents a tractable framework that embeds the allocation of limited attention into competition theory. Motivated by evidence from psychology and marketing a setting is studied where firms can manipulate consumer attention and compete in prices among perceived alternatives. The introduction of limited attention changes the positive and normative predictions obtained from otherwise standard models, such as Salop-style competition. Further, the model identifies when limited attention is beneficial or harmful to firms, and explains why the individually rational decision to become less attentive in presence of more choice options may be catalyzed to a collective inattention trap over the market mechanism.

JEL Classification: D43, L13, D01, L11, D62, C72

Keywords: Attention; Imperfect Competition; Bounded rationality; Product Differentiation; Salience; Contest Theory

^{*}This article consolidates two previous working papers "Attention and Competition" (ECON working paper, 2012) and "Attention, Competition and Obfuscation" (Working paper, 2014).

[†]Corresponding author: Andreas Hefti, Bahnhofplatz 12, CH-8400 Winterthur. Email: heft@zhaw.ch. Author affiliations: I) School of Management and Law, Zurich University of Applied Sciences, II) Department of Economics, University of Zurich. Declarations of interest: None.

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/11032306

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/11032306

Daneshyari.com