



Short Communication

A note on “Price discount based on early order commitment in a single manufacturer-multiple retailer supply chain”

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ABSTRACT

In a recent paper by Xie et al. [Xie, J., Zhou, D., Wei, J.C., Zhao, X., 2010. Price discount based on early order commitment in a single manufacturer-multiple retailer supply chain. *European Journal of Operational Research* 200, 368–376], the authors have studied the early order commitment (EOC) strategy for a decentralized, two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers. They fail to provide an algorithm to determine the optimal EOC periods to minimize the total supply chain cost. This note proposes a polynomial-time algorithm to find the optimal solutions, and provides a new set of sufficient conditions under which the wholesale price discount scheme coordinates the whole supply chain.

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1. Introduction

In a recent paper, Xie et al. (2010) provided an analytical model to quantify the effects of early order commitment (EOC) strategy on the performance of a two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and N independent retailers. Under EOC strategy, retailer i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, N$) places her order x_i periods in advance, where x_i is called the EOC period for retailer i . In order to minimize the expected holding and shortage cost per period for the whole supply chain, Xie et al. (2010) proposed the following optimization problem:

$$\text{Min}_{0 \leq x_i \leq L_0 + 1} SC(x) = r_0 \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^N \left(\frac{\sigma_i}{1 - \rho_i} \right)^2 \sum_{j=L_i + x_i + 2}^{L_i + L_0 + 2} (1 - \rho_i^j)^2} + \sum_{i=1}^N r_i \frac{\sigma_i}{1 - \rho_i} \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{L_i + x_i + 1} (1 - \rho_i^j)^2}, \quad (1)$$

where $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)$ are decision variables, and $L_0 > 0$, $r_0 > 0$, $L_i > 0$, $d_i > 0$, $\sigma_i > 0$, $0 < \rho_i < 1$ and $r_i > 0$ ($i = 1, 2, \dots, N$) are known parameters (please refer to Xie et al., 2010 for details). They failed to provide an algorithm to find an optimal solution to Problem (1). In Section 2 of this note, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm to find the optimal solutions.

Xie et al. (2010) also proposed a wholesale price discount scheme to induce the retailers to practice EOC strategy and identified a set of sufficient conditions under which the scheme coordinates the whole supply chain. In Section 3 of this note, we provide a new set of sufficient conditions which also leads to supply chain coordination.

2. An optimal algorithm

In Theorem 1 of Xie et al. (2010), they identified an amazing characteristic for the optimal solutions of Problem (1): the EOC period x_i for each retailer i should be either 0 or $L_0 + 1$. Therefore, we can define $y_i = (L_0 + 1 - x_i)/(L_0 + 1)$, where $y_i \in \{0, 1\}$ ($i = 1, 2, \dots, N$), and $y_i = 0$ means that retailer i uses EOC policy, and $y_i = 1$ means that retailer i does not use EOC policy. After the variable redefinition, the objective function $SC(x)$ in Problem (1) can be expressed as a function of $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N)$:

$$\overline{SC}(y) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N a_i y_i \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} - \sum_{i=1}^N b_i y_i + c, \quad (2)$$

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where

$$a_i = \left(\frac{\sigma_i r_0}{1 - \rho_i}\right)^2 \sum_{j=L_i+2}^{L_i+L_0+2} (1 - \rho_i^j)^2, \tag{3}$$

$$b_i = \frac{r_i \sigma_i}{1 - \rho_i} \left(\sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{L_0+L_i+2} (1 - \rho_i^j)^2} - \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{L_i+1} (1 - \rho_i^j)^2} \right), \tag{4}$$

$$c = \sum_{i=1}^N r_i \frac{\sigma_i}{1 - \rho_i} \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{L_0+L_i+2} (1 - \rho_i^j)^2}. \tag{5}$$

Since a_i, b_i, c are constants independent of the decision variables, Problem (1) is equivalent to the following 0–1 programming problem:

$$\text{Min}_{y_i \in \{0,1\}} f(y) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N a_i y_i\right)^{\frac{1}{2}} - \sum_{i=1}^N b_i y_i. \tag{6}$$

Now consider the following class of 0–1 programming problems:

$$\text{Min}_{y_i \in \{0,1\}} f(y) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^N a_i y_i\right)^p - \left(\sum_{i=1}^N b_i y_i\right)^q, \tag{7}$$

where $a_i > 0, b_i > 0, 0 \leq p \leq 1$ and $q \geq 1$. Obviously, Problem (6) is a special case of Problem (7) with $p = 1/2, q = 1$. For Problem (7), we have the following theorem.

Theorem 1. Suppose that N pairs of positive numbers $(a_i, b_i), i = 1, 2, \dots, N$, satisfy $a_1/b_1 \geq a_2/b_2 \geq a_3/b_3 \geq \dots \geq a_N/b_N$.

- (a) If $p = q = 1$, then there exists a binary vector $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N)$ minimizing (7) and satisfying the following property: If $y_j = 0$ for some $j (1 \leq j \leq N)$, then $y_i = 0$ for any $1 \leq i < j$.
- (b) If $0 \leq p < 1$ and $q \geq 1$, or $0 \leq p \leq 1$ and $q > 1$, then the binary vector $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_N)$ minimizing (7) should satisfy the following property: If $y_j = 0$ for some $j (1 \leq j \leq N)$, then $y_i = 0$ for any $1 \leq i < j$.

Proof. Part (a) is obviously true. For Part (b), we only provide a proof for the case of $0 \leq p < 1$ and $q \geq 1$, since the proof for the other case is similar.

Suppose y is a binary vector minimizing (7) with $y_j = 0$ for some $j (1 \leq j \leq N)$ and $y_i = 1$ for some $1 \leq i < j$. Denote y' as a binary vector where $y'_i = 0$ and $y'_k = y_k$ for all $k \neq i$. By contradiction, we only need to prove that $f(y') < f(y)$.

Denote $A = \sum_{k \neq i, j} a_k y_k$ and $B = \sum_{k \neq i, j} b_k y_k$. By definition of $f(y), f(y') < f(y)$ is equivalent to

$$(A + a_i)^p - A^p > (B + b_i)^q - B^q. \tag{8}$$

To prove Inequality (8), we choose y'' such that $y''_i = y''_j = 1$ and $y''_k = y_k$ for all $k \neq i, j$. Since y is an optimal solution of (7), we have $f(y) \leq f(y'')$, which is equivalent to

$$(A + a_i + a_j)^p - (A + a_i)^p \geq (B + b_i + b_j)^q - (B + b_i)^q. \tag{9}$$

Since $a_i > 0$ and $b_i > 0$ for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$, Inequality (9) implies Inequality (8) if the following inequality holds:

$$\frac{(A + a_i)^p - A^p}{(A + a_i + a_j)^p - (A + a_i)^p} > \frac{(B + b_i)^q - B^q}{(B + b_i + b_j)^q - (B + b_i)^q}. \tag{10}$$

Now we prove Inequality (10). Consider a function $g(u) = u^p$. By Mean Value Theorem, there exists a $\xi \in (A + a_i, A + a_i + a_j)$ such that

$$p \xi^{p-1} = g'(\xi) = \frac{(A + a_i + a_j)^p - (A + a_i)^p}{a_j}. \tag{11}$$

Similarly, there exists a $\eta \in (A, A + a_i)$ such that

$$p \eta^{p-1} = g'(\eta) = \frac{(A + a_i)^p - A^p}{a_i}. \tag{12}$$

Clearly, $0 < \eta < \xi$. This, together with the fact that $g'(u) = pu^{p-1} (0 \leq p < 1)$ is strictly decreasing with respect to $u (u > 0)$, implies that $p \eta^{p-1} > p \xi^{p-1}$. Therefore, by Eqs. (11) and (12), we have

$$\frac{(A + a_i)^p - A^p}{a_i} > \frac{(A + a_i + a_j)^p - (A + a_i)^p}{a_j},$$

which is equivalent to

$$\frac{(A + a_i)^p - A^p}{(A + a_i + a_j)^p - (A + a_i)^p} > \frac{a_i}{a_j}. \tag{13}$$

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