Accepted Manuscript

An Adaptive Trust-Stackelberg Game Model for Security and Energy Efficiency in Dynamic Cognitive Radio Networks

He Fang, Li Xu, Jie Li, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

 PII:
 S0140-3664(16)30628-4

 DOI:
 10.1016/j.comcom.2016.11.012

 Reference:
 COMCOM 5415

To appear in: Computer Communications

Received date:22 February 2016Revised date:28 October 2016Accepted date:29 November 2016

Please cite this article as: He Fang, Li Xu, Jie Li, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, An Adaptive Trust-Stackelberg Game Model for Security and Energy Efficiency in Dynamic Cognitive Radio Networks, *Computer Communications* (2016), doi: 10.1016/j.comcom.2016.11.012

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



An Adaptive Trust-Stackelberg Game Model for Security and Energy Efficiency in Dynamic Cognitive Radio Networks

He Fang^a, Li Xu^{a,*}, Jie Li^b, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo^c

 ^aFujian Provincial Key Laboratory of Network Security and Cryptology, School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou, China.
 ^bFaculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba Science City, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan.
 ^cDepartment of Information Systems and Cyber Security, The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249-0631, USA.

Abstract

Due to the potential of cooperative cognitive radio networks (CCRNs) in addressing the spectrum scarcity problem in wireless communication networks, CCRN has become a subject of active research. For example, security and energy efficiency are two salient areas of research in CCRNs. In this paper, we propose a novel adaptive trust-Stackelberg game model designed to (a) improve the energy efficiency and (b) defend against insider attacks in CCRNs. More specifically, the distributed learning algorithm (DLA) for the relays in our model, inspired by the stochastic learning automata, allows the system to achieve Stackelberg equilibrium in the proposed game; and the trust evolution based on evolutionary stable strategy algorithm (TEEA) allows the primary user to defend against insider attacks efficiently and adaptively adjust the trust evolution in dynamic CCRNs. We demonstrate the utility of the proposed model comparing with other models using a numerical investigation. The numerical results show that the proposed model can improve the performance in energy efficiency and defending against insider attacks with an appropriate cooperation between primary users and relays.

Preprint submitted to Journal of LATEX Templates

November 30, 2016

^{*}Corresponding author

URL: xuli@fjnu.edu.cn (Li Xu)

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/4954327

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/4954327

Daneshyari.com