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Coordination Mechanisms for Scheduling Games with Proportional Deterioration

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Highlights

- We consider coordination mechanisms for scheduling games with proportional deterioration.
- We study the inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium with social cost of minimizing makespan/total load.
- We obtain parametrically tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy of Nash Equilibrium.
- Convex programming is used to obtain tight bounds.

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