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An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information

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Highlights

- We study rent-seeking contests with private information.
- We propose a method to approximate the optimal level of investment in the game.
- The method only requires knowledge of the mean of the distribution of valuations.
- We compare the approximate and the optimal solutions in a variety of contexts.
- The method performs well across a wide range of model specifications.

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