Accepted Manuscript

The Hawk-Dove game in phenotypically homogeneous and heterogeneous populations of finite dimension


Annick Laruelle, André Barreira da Silva Rocha, Ramón Escobedo

PII: \$1007-5704(17)30235-6 DOI: 10.1016/j.cnsns.2017.06.028

Reference: CNSNS 4248

To appear in: Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation

Received date: 23 February 2017 Revised date: 16 May 2017 Accepted date: 18 June 2017



Please cite this article as: Annick Laruelle, André Barreira da Silva Rocha, Ramón Escobedo, The Hawk-Dove game in phenotypically homogeneous and heterogeneous populations of finite dimension, *Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation* (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.cnsns.2017.06.028

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Highlights

- A genetic algorithm is proposed to study the Hawk-Dove game at the microscopic level in finite populations.
- Heterogeneous populations are considered: there are two types of individuals, so that strategies depend on the type of the opponent.
- We show that, as in the Wright-Fisher infinitely many alleles model, the strategies in the population are permanently renewed.
- In spite of that, a stable but dynamic average behavior emerges at the population level.
- The genetic algorithm converges to a neutrally stable set predicted by the evolutionary game theory.

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/5011440

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/5011440

<u>Daneshyari.com</u>