


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Title: Deterring Poaching of a Common Pool Resource

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Highlights

- We examine how poaching affects common-pool resource management using lab experiments.
- Resource users employ sanctions to regulate in-group harvest and deter out-group poaching.
- Insiders perfectly monitor each other but monitoring of outsiders varies across treatments.
- Monitoring has a non-monotonic effect on poaching.
- Insiders used perfect monitoring of outsiders to reduce poaching and to better coordinate their own harvests.

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