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Task

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HIGHLIGHTS:

- A supervisor can monitor or audit the agent's performance.
- We show the existence of a trade-off between monitoring and auditing.
- The trade-off arises when the supervisor is corruptible.
- Auditing reduces the expected cost of supervision.
- Monitoring prevents corruption at a lower cost.

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