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What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?

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*Highlights (for review)

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- I determine the Nash-equilibria resulting from participants' elicited preferences.
- Multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard 3-player setting.
- Multiple equilibria are more frequent than Fehr & Schmidt's (1999) model predicts.
- Hence, omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising.

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