Accepted Manuscript

On Corporate Capital Structure Adjustments

Viet Anh Dang, Ian Garrett

PII: S1544-6123(15)00060-4

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2015.05.016

Reference: FRL 384

To appear in: Finance Research Letters

Received Date: 30 January 2015 Accepted Date: 25 May 2015



Please cite this article as: Dang, V.A., Garrett, I., On Corporate Capital Structure Adjustments, *Finance Research Letters* (2015), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2015.05.016

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

ON CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENTS

Viet Anh Dang* and Ian Garrett⁺ Manchester Business School

Abstract

Recent research has examined asymmetries in firms' adjustments toward target leverage. Assuming firms mainly adjust their debt levels, Byoun (2008) finds that firms adjusting most quickly possess two important characteristics: above-target debt and a financing surplus. Using alternative models allowing for adjustments in both debt *and* total assets, we still find evidence of asymmetries in leverage adjustments, but that firms adjusting fastest have above-target leverage and a financing deficit. Our paper shows how alternative assumptions about leverage dynamics may lead to different conclusions about target adjustment behavior.

JEL Classification: G32.

Keywords: Capital structure; Dynamic trade-off theory; Partial adjustment model; Asymmetric adjustment; Model specification.

^{*} Corresponding author: Viet A. Dang, Email: <u>Vietanh.Dang@mbs.ac.uk</u>, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Booth Street West, M15 6PB, UK, Tel: +44 (0) 161 275 0438, Fax +44 (0) 161 275 4023.

⁺ Ian Garrett, Email: <u>Ian.Garrett@mbs.ac.uk</u>, Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Booth Street West, M15 6PB, UK, Tel: +44 (0)161 275 4958.

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/5069528

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/5069528

Daneshyari.com