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

Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks

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Highlights

- We study network formation prior to a bargaining game on the network.
- A complete characterization of generically pairwise stable networks is established.
- Unions of separated pairs, odd circles, and isolated players constitute this class.
- Diversity of induced bargaining outcomes is small in pairwise stable networks.

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