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An Experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games

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
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Highlights

- We study cooperation in probabilistically and finitely repeated linear VCM games.
- We find no consistent evidence that cooperation rates are higher in probabilistic games.
- Cooperation is found to increase in the marginal value of the public good.
- Over time, there is a pronounced decrease in cooperation in the final round of finite sequences.

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