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Attacking the Unknown Weapons of a Potential Bomb Builder: The Impact of Intelligence on the Strategic Interaction

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
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## Highlights

- Nation 1 could secretly build a nuclear weapon. Nation 2 can attack to prevent this.
- 1 may choose to open its facilities thereby proving no weapon and avoiding attack.
- 2 operates an imperfect Intelligence System (IS) to assess the presence of a bomb.
- For plausible models, a better IS makes 2 less aggressive when a bomb is detected.
- With positive probability: there is no bomb; IS indicates this correctly; 2 still attacks.

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