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Dilemmas, coordination and defection: How uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction

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
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Highlights

- CPRs often create two dilemmas: A coordination problem and a prisoner's dilemma.
- Threshold uncertainty around resources' tipping points induces resource destruction.
- Policies significantly improve outcomes in the context of CPRs with tipping points.

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