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Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities

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
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Highlights

- The planner's strategies to increase the actions of agents in interaction are analyzed.
- Complementarities: Agents react positively to their exposures to others' actions.
- Important effect of the convexity/concavity of the reaction.
- With a linear reaction, two centralities indices support the optimal strategies.
- The value of information on the interaction structure is assessed.

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