

Accepted Manuscript

Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates

Dimitrios Xefteris


PII: S0899-8256(17)30120-3
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.005>
Reference: YGAME 2719

To appear in: *Games and Economic Behavior*

Received date: 22 December 2015

Please cite this article in press as: Xefteris, D. Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates. *Games Econ. Behav.* (2017), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.005>

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.



Highlights

- Multidimensional Downsian competition rarely admits an equilibrium in pure strategies ([Plott, 1967](#)).
- We revisit this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are differentiated.
- That is, candidates strategically decide positions only in some of the n dimensions while in the rest of them their positions are assumed to be fixed.
- We find that for any distribution of voters' bliss points, a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is guaranteed to exist if candidates are sufficiently differentiated.
- This is true even if there exists a unique fixed dimension and candidates are flexible in all other $n - 1$ dimensions.

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/5071395>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/5071395>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)