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Reminder Game: Indirectness in Persuasion

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
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Highlights

- The sender tries to persuade the receiver with limited memory by sending a costless message.
- Given a private signal, the receiver chooses whether to remember an alternative to form her consideration set.
- The sender then decides whether to send a costless message that can remind the receiver of the alternative.
- In spite of the strong conflict of interest, the sender's costless message can be informative in equilibrium.
- Being more "indirect" conveys more positive information in any informative equilibrium.

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