Accepted Manuscript

Vagueness and information-sharing

Marta Troya-Martinez


PII: S0899-8256(16)30092-6

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.003

Reference: YGAME 2587

To appear in: Games and Economic Behavior

Received date: 7 January 2013



Please cite this article in press as: Troya-Martinez, M. Vagueness and information-sharing. *Games Econ. Behav.* (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.003

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Highlights

- We model the information-sharing between two principals taking a binary decision.
- The agent secretly chooses the precision of the information given to the principals.
- Without information-sharing the agent uses an extreme precision.
- Sharing-information induces the agent to make a greater use of imprecise information.
- Information-sharing may be good or bad depending on the expected decision.

Download English Version:

https://daneshyari.com/en/article/5071456

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/5071456

<u>Daneshyari.com</u>