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Evolution and Kantian morality

Ingela Alger, Jörgen W. Weibull


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Highlights

- A definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in arbitrarily large groups is proposed.
- A particular class of moral preferences, *homo moralis*, are evolutionarily stable.
- Preferences leading to behaviors other than those of *homo moralis* are evolutionarily unstable.
- A connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and that of strategies is established.

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