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The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

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Highlights

- Divide-and-choose is superior to winner's bid auction in partnership dissolution problems when agents know each other well.
 Divide-and-choose performance is affected by reciprocity issues and not bounded rationality.
 Winner-bid's auction is affected by bounded rationality and not by coordination issues.

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