

## Accepted Manuscript

Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated Prisoner's dilemma

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
PII: S0899-8256(15)00082-2  
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005>  
Reference: YGAME 2432

To appear in: *Games and Economic Behavior*

Received date: 16 August 2013

Please cite this article in press as: Hilbe, C., et al. Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated Prisoner's dilemma. *Games Econ. Behav.* (2015), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005>

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## Highlights

- We consider 3 different strategy classes for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.
- With partner strategies, players ensure that mutual cooperation is a stable equilibrium.
- A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player
- With a ZD strategy, a player can unilaterally enforce a linear relation between payoffs.
- We characterize these 3 classes within the space of memory-one strategies.

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