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Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching

Javier Rivas


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Javier Rivas

Department of Economics, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH, United Kingdom

Highlights

► Random matching and imitation are incompatible with cooperation in a society. ► If there is partial rematching then cooperation is possible. ► Slower imitation makes cooperation more likely in a population.

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