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Auctions with Bid Credits and Resale

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Highlights

- Auction designs routinely impose bid credits favoring subsets of bidders
- Bid credits create inefficiencies and incentives for resale and affect bid strategies
- Negative effects of bid credits and resale can be mitigated
- We analyze restrictions on resale, caps on credits, reserves, and anonymous bidding

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