## **Accepted Manuscript**

Inferring Ascending Auction Participation from Observed Bidders

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PII: S0167-7187(17)30365-X DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.001

Reference: INDOR 2372

To appear in: International Journal of Industrial Organization

Received date: 25 April 2016 Revised date: 18 April 2017 Accepted date: 1 June 2017



Please cite this article as: Brennan C. Platt, Inferring Ascending Auction Participation from Observed Bidders, *International Journal of Industrial Organization* (2017), doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.001

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## Highlights

- Ascending auctions will force willing participants to abstain from bidding if their valuation is below the standing price on arrival.
- The number of participants can be accurately estimated from the observed number of bidders with computationally-simple techniques.
- This also enables more accurate estimation of bidder valuations, which otherwise are biased towards higher valuations.

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