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Price Competition When Three are Few and Four are Many

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#### ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

## Highlights

- Price competition when prices are observed subject to noise is studied.
- There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
- Maximum possible price prevails when there are up to three sellers.
- The marginal cost pricing is never observed.

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