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Title: ESTIMATING JudICIAL IDEAL POINTS in THE SPANISH SUPREME COURT: The Case of ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

<AT>ESTIMATING JudICIAL IDEAL POINTS in THE SPANISH SUPREME COURT:
THE CASE OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

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<ABS-HEAD>Highlights► the paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain (2000-2008) in the area of administrative review ► the estimation of judicial ideology controls for dissent suppression effort ► we identify political clusters which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically neutral ► we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus

<ABS-HEAD>Abstract

<ABS-P>This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Spain in the specific area of administrative review for the period 2000-2008, controlling for dissent suppression effort. The estimated ideal points allow us to identify political clusters in the Supreme Court which seem inconsistent with the formal and traditional views that a career judiciary is politically not strongly aligned. At the same time, we find evidence that confirms a trend favoring consensus and dissent avoidance.
<KWD>Keywords: career judiciary; judicial behavior; empirical legal studies; Spanish Supreme Court; ideal point; ideology; dissent avoidance.

<H1>1 Introduction
In this paper, we address judicial behavior in the Supreme Court of Spain with an empirical methodology based on estimated ideal points. The American empirical literature on the behavior of Supreme Court Justices has developed a refined method for estimating an individual Justice's ideal point based on how the Justice manifests his or her views in dissenting and concurring opinions.<xps:span class="xps_endnote">1</xps:span> Technically, the empirical method of estimation reveals those points in some n–dimensional space of politically relevant choices, which Justices prefer over all other points in that space. The spatial voting approach allows scholars to estimate judicial ideal points by ranking them in one or more dimensions.
In the context of the U.S. Supreme Court, it has been shown that the ideal points of individual Justices can be consistently estimated in a one-dimensional space that reflects the traditional

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