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- The allocation of political rents in bills subject to judicial review is studied.
- Concrete judicial review may lead to less rent diffusion among the political parties.
- Abstract judicial review may favor the parties that command large status-quo rents.
- These results inform the debates on the effectiveness and consequences of review.

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