

## Accepted Manuscript

Corporate lobbying and labor relations: Evidence from employee-level litigations

Omer Unsal, M. Kabir Hassan, Duygu Zirek



PII: S0929-1199(17)30158-X  
DOI: doi: [10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.08.005](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.08.005)  
Reference: CORFIN 1245  
To appear in: *Journal of Corporate Finance*  
Received date: 13 March 2017  
Revised date: 31 July 2017  
Accepted date: 11 August 2017

Please cite this article as: Omer Unsal, M. Kabir Hassan, Duygu Zirek , Corporate lobbying and labor relations: Evidence from employee-level litigations, *Journal of Corporate Finance* (2017), doi: [10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.08.005](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.08.005)

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

**Corporate Lobbying and Labor Relations:  
Evidence from Employee-Level Litigations**

Omer Unsal  
Assistant Professor of Finance  
Girard School of Business  
Merrimack College  
315 Turnpike Street, North Andover, MA 01845  
Email: unsalo@merrimack.edu  
Phone : (269) 548-5524

M. Kabir Hassan  
Professor of Finance and  
Hibernia Professor of Economics and Finance  
Department of Economics and Finance  
University of New Orleans  
New Orleans, LA 70148  
Email: mhassan@uno.edu  
Phone: 504-280-6163

Duygu Zirek  
Assistant Professor of Finance  
Department of Economics and Finance  
University of New Orleans  
New Orleans, LA 70148  
Email: dzirek@uno.edu  
Phone: (504) 280-6913

**Abstract**

In this study, we analyze employee litigation and other work-related complaints to examine if the judicial process favors firms that engage in lobbying. We gather data for 27,794 employee lawsuits (after their initial court hearings) filed between 2000 and 2014 and test the relationship between employee allegations and firms' lobbying strategies. We find that employee litigation increases the number of labor-related bills in our sample. We document that an increase in employee lawsuits may drive firms into lobbying to change policy proposals. We also find robust evidence that case outcomes are different for lobbying firms compared to non-lobbying rivals, which may protect shareholder wealth in the long run. Our results suggest lobbying activities may make a significant

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/5093118>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/5093118>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)