

Accepted Manuscript

Is informal risk-sharing less effective for the poor? Risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance

Matthieu Delpierre, Bertrand Verheyden, Stéphanie Weynants

PII: S0304-3878(15)00110-8
DOI: doi: [10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.003)
Reference: DEVEC 2024

To appear in: *Journal of Development Economics*

Received date: 13 September 2011
Revised date: 8 September 2015
Accepted date: 10 September 2015



Please cite this article as: Delpierre, Matthieu, Verheyden, Bertrand, Weynants, Stéphanie, Is informal risk-sharing less effective for the poor? Risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance, *Journal of Development Economics* (2015), doi: [10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.09.003)

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Is informal risk-sharing less effective for the poor?

Risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance

Matthieu Delpierre*, Bertrand Verheyden[†] and Stéphanie Weynants^{‡§}

September 17, 2015

Abstract

Poor farm-households are less keen to adopt high risk/high return technologies than rich households. Yet, the poor are more vulnerable to income shocks. We develop a model of endogenous risk-taking to explain these facts. In autarky, poor households adopt less risky production plans and obtain lower expected returns, but face higher relative risk than the rich. The introduction of risk-sharing generates negative risk externalities between agents. At the first best, the social planner imposes a homogeneous level of risk-taking in the group. At the second best, risk-taking is not enforceable and increases with insurance, generating moral hazard. Interestingly, the poor's risk-taking behavior is more sensitive to insurance. The social planner thus mitigates risk-taking by applying a lower insurance coverage in poor groups. The introduction of risk-sharing therefore reinforces the gap between rich and poor in terms of expected income and absolute risk, while the effect on relative risk is ambiguous.

*LISER, Luxembourg and Earth and Life Institute, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium; corresponding author, MatthieuDelpierreG@gmail.com

[†]LISER, Luxembourg

[‡]University of Namur, Belgium

[§]The authors are grateful to Frédéric Gaspard, Jean-Philippe Platteau, Stefan Dercon, Pierre Dubois, Bruno Henry de Frahan, Tessa Bold, Fabrice Valognes, Anne-Claire Thomas, Philippe Van Kerm, Steve Boucher, Michael Carter, Arnaud Dupuy and two anonymous referees of the *Journal of Development Economics* for helpful comments and suggestions. The paper has also benefited from presentations at University of Louvain, the CSAE conference in Oxford, the DIAL conference in Paris and the EAAE conference in Dublin.

Download English Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/en/article/5094407>

Download Persian Version:

<https://daneshyari.com/article/5094407>

[Daneshyari.com](https://daneshyari.com)