## Accepted Manuscript

Institutions and Financial Frictions: Estimating with Structural Restrictions on Firm Value and Investment

Stijn Claessens, Kenichi Ueda, Yishay Yafeh

PII: S0304-3878(14)00068-6

DOI: doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.05.004

Reference: DEVEC 1910

To appear in: Journal of Development Economics

Received date: 6 March 2013 Revised date: 27 April 2014 Accepted date: 21 May 2014



Please cite this article as: Claessens, Stijn, Ueda, Kenichi, Yafeh, Yishay, Institutions and Financial Frictions: Estimating with Structural Restrictions on Firm Value and Investment, *Journal of Development Economics* (2014), doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.05.004

This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

## **ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT**

# Institutions and Financial Frictions: Estimating with Structural Restrictions on Firm Value and Investment

Stijn Claessens\*, Kenichi Ueda+, and Yishay Yafeh

April 24, 2014

#### Abstract

Using an enhanced version of the standard investment model, we estimate how institutions affect financial frictions at the firm (micro) level and, through the required rate of return, at the country (macro) level. Based on some 78,000 firm-year observations from 40 countries over the period 1990-2007, we show that good shareholder rights lower financial frictions, especially for firms with large external finance relative to their capital stock (e.g., small, growing or distressed firms). However, creditor rights generally do not affect financial frictions. It thus appears that in explaining cross-country differences in firm investment, frictions related to shareholder rights (e.g., shirking or "tunneling") are more relevant than debt-related frictions (e.g., limited liability or collateral constraints).

JEL Classification Numbers: G30, O16, O43

Keywords: Financial friction, investment, Tobin's Q, institutions, investor protection

Acknowledgments and Disclaimer: We would like to thank the referees, Toni Braun, Murillo Campello, Giovanni Favara, Joe Kaboski, Ivo Krznar, Akito Matsumoto, Alex Monge, Ken Singleton, Ken West, Jeff Wooldridge, and seminar participants at the Bank of Japan, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, George Washington University, the IMF, Michigan State University, Pennsylvania State University, and the University of Tokyo, as well as conference participants at the Dubrovnik Economic Conference, the Society for Economic Dynamics Conference in Montreal, the 10<sup>th</sup> Econometric Society World Congress, and the Financial Underpinnings of Macro Models Workshop at MIT for helpful comments. We are grateful to Zeynep Elif Aksoy and Mohsan Bilal for excellent research assistance. Part of this project was undertaken while Yafeh was a Visiting Scholar at the IMF Research Department and while Ueda was visiting the Department of Economics, MIT. Yafeh would also like to thank the Krueger Center for Research in Finance at the Hebrew University for its support. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board or its management.

<sup>\*</sup> Research Department, IMF, 700 19th Street N.W., Washington, DC 20431, U.S.A, University of Amsterdam, CEPR, and ECGI. Email: <a href="mailto:sclaessens@imf.org">sclaessens@imf.org</a>

<sup>+</sup> Money and Capital Markets Department, IMF, 700 19th Street N.W., Washington, DC 20431, U.S.A. Email: kueda@imf.org

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> School of Business Administration, The Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel, CEPR, and ECGI. Email: <a href="mailto:yishay.yafeh@huji.ac.il">yishay.yafeh@huji.ac.il</a>

### Download English Version:

## https://daneshyari.com/en/article/5094490

Download Persian Version:

https://daneshyari.com/article/5094490

<u>Daneshyari.com</u>