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Speculator-Triggered Crisis and Interventions

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Highlights

- A speculator and an authority are added to a benchmark global game model.
- The speculator can make the financial system more vulnerable by triggering a crisis.
- Three speculator-counteracting intervention policies are investigated and compared.
- Policies used during 1997 Asian financial crisis are linked to theoretical results.

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